The Battle of Adwa, 1 March, 1896.

 The Battle of Adwa, 1 March, 1896.

126 years ago, on the 1st of March 1896, the Ethiopian Empire under Menelik II inflicted the greatest military defeat on a European colonial power during the Scramble for Africa, when they decisively defeated the Italians at the battle of Adwa. Over 100.000 Ethiopians bore down on the c. 14,500 Italian and Ascari troops with an unovercomable zeal, that has since become legendary. 

What follows is a rundown of the battle, from “Armies of of the Adowa Campaign 1896”, by Sean McLachlan. 

“THE BATTLE 

The attacks on Albertone’s command 

It was Ras Alula’s scouts who sighted Albertone’s troops as they came into position; despite being on the Ethiopian left (north) wing, and thus furthest from Albertone’s brigade, the victor of Dogali was the first to spot them because he had scouts active across the entire area. Soon the entire Ethiopian camp was alerted, and began forming up to envelop the invaders. On the right, south of Adowa, was King Tecla Aimanot and his troops from Gojjam, with the cavalry in front. In Adowa itself was Ras Mekonnen with his Harari troops. To the north of Adowa was Ras Mikael leading the Wollo Oromo. North of him was Ras Mangasha and his Tigré troops, and in the far north of the line was Ras Alula. In reserve on the hills just west of Adowa, where the church of St George stands, were the Emperor Menelik and Empress Taitu, with the warriors of Ras Olié and Wagshum Guangul. The Oromo cavalry were grazing their ponies in meadows some 8 miles away, but they were soon informed of the situation, and mounted up. Menelik and Taitu went into the church of St George to pray; the empress, surrounded by her retainers, bent low with a stone on her neck, a traditional method of prayer in times of emergency. Nearby priests from Axum carrying the Ark of the Covenant prayed for victory.

The Ethiopian units closest to Albertone’s advanced position on the slopes of the Hill of Enda Kidane Meret first moved to the attack at perhaps 6am. These included troops under Menelik, King Tecla Aimanot, Ras Mikael, and Ras Mangasha, while those of Ras Mekonnen and Ras Olié came up soon after, so a large proportion of the Ethiopian army was soon concentrated against Albertone’s isolated Native Brigade. The first of his units to come under fire was the 1st Native Bn, which itself had strayed too far ahead of Albertone’s main body .

Still unaware of the dangerous position into which Albertone had got his brigade, Gen Baratieri spent a full hour going over the ground on which he planned to fight and preparing for an Ethiopian advance. He could hear firing in the distance, but assumed that it was only some pickets skirmishing. At 6.45am Baratieri gave another order that was wrongly interpreted. He told Dabormida to advance from Rebbi Arienni to the Spur of Belah to support by fire Albertone, whom he assumed to be at the ‘false Kidane Meret’ or at most a little ahead of it. However, once Dabormida got his 2nd Bde to a point west of the Spur, and discovered that Albertone was much further off than supposed, he continued to advance westwards – very slowly, across difficult ground. The nature of the terrain also led Dabormida further to the Italian right, so that – despite his mission to support Albertone – he in fact ended up in the west–east arm of the Mariam Shavitu valley, roughly in line with but about 3 miles north of the Native Brigade. The Spur of Belah was left unguarded after 7.45am (and a glance at the map will show how important it was to the Italian line). To add to the difficulties, Arimondi’s 1st Bde had been stuck behind Dabormida on a single path while approaching Rebbi Arienni, so he was late getting all his men into position in the centre. The three forward Italian brigades were now completely separated, and each would fight a more numerous foe, in three separate actions throughout the day. The Italian army had set itself up to be defeated in detail.

At 8.15am the morning mists cleared, and Gen Baratieri climbed part way up Mt Eshasho to survey the situation. He could see that Albertone was engaged, and that none of the other units was close enough to support him. But for some inexplicable reason, an hour later Dabormida reported that he was ‘holding out his hand to Albertone’; this extraordinarily imprecise wording allowed Baratieri to assume that Dabormida was, at least, about to link up with Albertone – but this was not the case, and never would be. Baratieri headed south to another observation position on a plateau south of Mt Raio. This towering peak could only be climbed part way; as the author can confirm, the highest reachable ledge affords sweeping views in some directions, but not towards Albertone’s positions.

Albertone’s advanced 1st Native Bn saw tough fighting from about 7.30am to 8.30am, while the rest of the brigade were held back on hills north-east of Enda Kidane. Albertone’s artillery inflicted heavy losses, but as the 1st Native Bn withdrew the Ethiopians rushed forward, destroyed the rearguard company, and drove the rest before them in panic flight. Albertone’s main body managed to stop the Ethiopians once they came into rifle range, but by that time perhaps 18,000 warriors had begun to envelop the entire brigade with a half-moon formation. The stronger Ethiopian left (north) wing occupied Mt Gusoso between Albertone’s and Dabormida’s positions; this wing included men from the commands of Ras Mekonnen, Ras Mangasha, Ras Olié and Wagshum Guangul.

For a time the Italians held firm, inflicting heavy casualties, but then the Ethiopians set up ‘quick-firing batteries’ on Mt Enda Kidane, and Menelik committed thousands more warriors from his own command. Both flanks of the Native Bde soon collapsed, and at about 10.30am the badly mauled centre fell back to the north-east; the retreat soon turned into a rout, as Ethiopians rushed in on all sides. Two batteries tried to cover the withdrawal; one three-gun battery was captured, retaken by some ascari at bayonet-point, and then lost once more; the other batteries were also overrun, and their crews all but wiped out. General Albertone himself was captured. Locals still point out the spot where the fighting was hottest; they call it Mindibdib, ‘cut to pieces’. Advancing bands of Ethiopian foot and horse soon filled the Mai Agam valley.

In the meantime, Baratieri had sent a message to Dabormida to help Albertone, but the messenger decided that he could turn back when he met the courier coming to inform Baratieri that Dabormida was ‘holding out his hand’ to Albertone. Baratieri sent two more messengers with the same order, but neither reached Dabormida. Baratieri still assumed that Dabormida had a solid hold on the Spur of Belah, covering Arimondi’s right and the potential line of withdrawal. In fact Dabormida had sent only local auxiliaries to the Spur, and by about 9.30am they had been driven off it by infiltrating Ethiopians. Although Baratieri could not find Dabormida, the Ethiopians could; they had been attacking him fiercely since 9.30am, and had all but cut him off.

The centre and reserve

Baratieri organized Arimondi’s command in the centre, reduced to 1,773 men because De Amicis’ 4th Infantry Bn had been detached to cover Dabormida’s potential line of retreat. The rest of Arimondi’s men took up positions around Mt Belah and Mt Raio. Galliano’s 3rd Native Bn from Gen Ellena’s reserve was hurried forward and positioned on Arimondi’s left wing. Ellena’s two quick-firer batteries were also brought up, while the rest of his force remained at Rebbi Arienni.

By 10am Arimondi’s men were opening fire on Ethiopians pursuing the fleeing remnants of Albertone’s brigade north-eastwards up the Mai Agam valley; they had to pick their targets carefully, however, as the warriors kept close behind the Italians. Small groups of Ethiopians crouched low and worked their way into position to face this new enemy. As these warriors sniped at Arimondi’s gun-crews and infantry, a large group of their countrymen appeared in the valley in front of the Spur of Belah, and poured up its slopes at about 10.30am. One wing – the same warriors who had driven a wedge between Albertone’s right and Dabormida’s left – swung around to their right to hit Ellena’s reserve force. Dabormida’s 2nd Bde, and De Amicis’ battalion far behind it, were now completely cut off. Two companies of Bersaglieri from Arimondi’s command and a regiment from Ellena’s reserve tried to retake the Spur, but were annihilated.

The attack on Dabormida’s command 

Warriors under Ras Mikael and Ras Mangasha, and a detachment of Ras Mekonnen’s men – some 15,000 warriors, with more coming – had spent the early morning mauling Albertone’s force, but once the Native Bde was doomed to destruction they took on the newly arrived Italian infantry to its north.

Shortly after 9am, Dabormida’s four advance companies had been attacked in overwhelming strength and beaten in 20 minutes. They were only a few hundred yards ahead of the main body of 2nd Bde, but invisible beyond a pair of steep ridges covered in thorn bushes. Soon the Ethiopians came upon Dabormida’s main line; this was anchored to high hills on its north and south flanks and stretched across the west–east arm of the Mariam Shavitu valley. The ascari charged twice, pushing the Ethiopians back with bayonets; the warriors approached more carefully after that, creeping through the high grass covering most of this area and sniping as they came. Once they got in close, they leapt up and charged, supported by hundreds of Oromo cavalry, but orderly rifle volleys and accurate artillery fire repulsed this attack as well.

The firing became desultory; the Ethiopians seem to have been limiting themselves to a holding engagement in this sector, and at around noon Dabormida ordered an advance. His line of retreat was covered by De Amicis’ 4th Infantry Bn and the native Kitet Company from Asmara under Capt Sermasi, who at 9.30am had positioned themselves on a small hill between the Spur and Dabormida’s position in the Mariam Shavitu valley. During the next couple of hours Dabormida’s troops stopped all Ethiopian attempts at envelopment; his artillery bombarded the Ethiopians and their cannons posted on the heights before him, but numerous charges by his infantry could not dislodge them. A final furious charge succeeded; but shortly thereafter – at about 1pm – a large body of Ethiopian infantry and cavalry with three guns swooped up from the south and put themselves between Dabormida’s new advanced position and De Amicis, although they were quickly pushed back. At the same time other warriors attacked Dabormida’s right flank. 

While this evidence of enemy in his rear must have worried Dabormida, he did not know that his was now the only Italian force still intact. Albertone had been overwhelmed; the centre under Arimondi was threatened from both its left and right flanks; Ellena’s reserve was engaged, and with Ethiopians now as far east as the Hollow of Gundapta the army’s route of retreat was threatened. Lieutenant-Colonel Galliano’s 3rd Native Bn, covering Arimondi’s left, now broke and fled, the officers and a few ascari who remained with them soon being overwhelmed. 

General Dabormida had been fighting mostly against Ras Alula’s troops, but now the bulk of the Ethiopians – some 40,000 men – turned on 2nd Brigade. By 2pm Dabormida, still unaware of the rout of the rest of the army, was nearly surrounded. His men were exhausted by their night march and long day’s fighting, suffering from thirst and hunger, and running low on ammunition. Dabormida ordered a final attack that temporarily pushed the Ethiopians back, allowing him to sound the retreat at perhaps 4.30pm. As with the Albertone, the Ethiopians came in close and harried the retreat from three sides. Two guns that tried to cover the retreat soon ran out of ammunition; they were overrun and their crews were killed to a man. The remnants of Dabormida’s force only escaped after great loss.

Dabormida himself was killed by a warrior named Shaqa Tamre, whom the English traveller Augustus Wylde interviewed shortly after the battle: ‘Dabormida had just shot three men with his revolver, he then shot at my informant and missed him. The Abyssinian got behind a tree, and when Dabormida turned to face another of his enemies he shot him dead… This man carried off the General’s sword, photographs, pocket-book and some other property, and afterwards sold them to an Italian officer who was a prisoner at Adese Ababa [sic].’

Retreat and pursuit 

General Baratieri, realizing that the battle was lost, ordered a general retreat. He tried to get the last uncommitted units of the reserve – 16th Native Bn, and two companies of the 5th Infantry Regt’s Alpini battalion – to cover the retreat, but before they could form up their lines were broken by a flood of fleeing soldiers intermingled with Ethiopians.

 Soon this final reserve was taking fire at close range from every angle – even from above, because the Ethiopians had now taken Mt Belah. The reserve had no chance to form a coherent defence, and soon got swept along with the tide. The Italian centre was now completely broken. Arimondi’s mule ran away in the confusion, and the general was killed along with many of his men.

The retreat was ill-coordinated owing to the impossibility of getting orders to all parts of the broken line, but by noon the remainder of Albertone’s, Arimondi’s, and Ellena’s troops were all withdrawing. A late arrival on the field, Capt Franzini’s artillery battery, showed up in time to get off just one shot before being overrun. A few isolated groups of ascari and Italians managed to engage in a fighting retreat – forming lines, firing, retreating a short distance, then forming and firing again – but they were in the minority. 

There were many instances of heroism by individuals and small parties, but most of the Italian army had become a fleeing mob, firing only when an Ethiopian appeared from behind a rock or tree to take a shot from point-blank range. Any Italian or ascaro who fell wounded was dispatched with spear or sword, and only a few managed to surrender alive; whether or not they could be considered lucky depended on their later fate. (There were reports of some officers and men shooting themselves to avoid capture.) In his memoirs, Gen Baratieri describes the disintegration of his army:

“The firing continued from the heights, on the flanks, and in the rear; and already, the ranks being broken, the tail of the retiring column became a confused mass of white men and black men, Ascari of Galliano, and Ascari of the other units, together with the Shoans [enemy], who dashed into the middle of them… Every moment the confusion kept increasing owing to the waves of men sweeping by, the hail of bullets, and the sight of the dead and dying… while one’s heart was being torn in two by the despair of ever being able to give an order or get it carried out.”

Baratieri reached Rebbi Arienni, where he managed to rally about a hundred Bersaglieri and Alpini. The Italians managed to push back the first wave of pursuers at the point of the bayonet, but the Ethiopian numbers soon swelled, and once again Baratieri had to retreat. Together with Gen Ellena he remained at the rear of the retreating column, trying in vain to organize a rearguard action. Baratieri recalls the state of his men at this time:

“They were almost unconscious of their surroundings, and careless of everything except their personal defence. The officers had lost authority over the soldiers, who looked in a bewildered and stupefied manner at those who gave an order or attempted to halt them.”

The Oromo cavalry swooped in on the weary, thirsty fugitives, riding up close to empty pistols into their ranks. More and more men got left behind; a few isolated pockets, completely surrounded, continued to resist, and firing could be heard on Mt Raio until 4pm. All of these remnants of the Italian army were wiped out or captured.

The main column under Baratieri, which was retreating northwards, was harried for 9 miles before the Ethiopian warriors gave up the pursuit, but beacon fires were then lit on the highest hilltops to signal the people of the countryside to rise and attack. The numbers can never be known, but it is certain that many Italian and ascari stragglers fell victim to vengeful peasants.

 Baratieri’s shattered army continued to retreat through the night of 1/2 March. The vanguard with the guides became separated from the main body in the darkness, and the troops under Gen Baratieri got lost three times. The main groups of survivors crossed the Belesa river and reached Adi Caieh and Adi Ugri – some 40 miles north of Adowa – on 3 and 4 March. 

Back at the battlefield the Ethiopians were celebrating. They chanted ‘Mow, mow down the tender grass! The corn of Italy that was sown in Tigré has been reaped by Menelik, and he has given it to the birds!’

The cost, and the aftermath 

On the battlefield and during the retreat the Italians lost a total of 6,133 men killed: 261 officers, 2,918 white NCOs and privates, 954 permanently missing, and about 2,000 ascari. Another 1,428 were wounded – 470 Italians (including 31 officers) and 958 ascari. The Ethiopians captured all 56 Italian guns. This was by far the most costly defeat yet suffered by a white colonial force at the hands of non-European enemies.

Although absolute accuracy is impossible, the total casualties represented about 53 per cent of Gen Baratieri’s command. Ethiopian losses are unclear, but are estimated to have been about 7,000 killed and 10,000 wounded – huge numbers, but still a far smaller percentage of their total strength in the field.

The Ethiopians took about 3,000–4,000 prisoners. Ascari who had been recruited in Tigré itself were considered to be traitors, and an estimated 800 of them had their right hand and left foot cut off; some were castrated. 

Despite individual horror stories, the Italians were generally treated better, but many died in the harsh conditions of the marches and camps they had to endure before their release, which began in May 1896.

This disastrous defeat had immediate repercussions in Italy. Prime Minister Crispi’s bellicose government fell. Baratieri was stripped of his governorship and court-martialed, the official reason being that he had abandoned his troops. He was rightly acquitted of this charge, but the tribunal declared him ‘entirely unfitted to cope with the exigencies of the situation’, and he retired in disgrace. 

The new government in Rome at once authorized his replacement, Gen Baldissera, to sue for peace. Menelik was already scouting out the road to Asmara when the envoy Maj Salsa brought him Rome’s offer of peace. Menelik agreed not to cross the Mereb river into the colony, in return for the immediate removal of the Italian troops at Adigrat; Salsa agreed, and promised more detailed discussions in the near future. In the event, Italian colonial expansion in Eritrea was abandoned for about 15 years.”